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Corporate Control Transactions
Frank H. Easterbrookt and Daniel R. Fischel-f

Transactions in corporate control often produce gains for the corporation. Substitution of one set of managers for another, for example, often
produces gains because assets increase in value under better management,
and would-be managers offer payments to shareholders to compete for the
for the right to manage the firm's pool of assets. In other situations managers may "squeeze out" some shareholders in order to reduce the agency
costs of management and thereby increase the value of the firm. Managers
of a parent corporation may decide that a combination with a partially
owned subsidiary will create gains because of economies of scale or management. Finally, managers may seek control of new business opportunities to maximize the profit from exploiting them.
These devices for allocating corporate control pose a common problem
because they sometimes involve an unequal division of the gains from the
transaction. Shares in a control bloc, for example, may be sold at a price
greater than that paid for the remaining shares; minority shareholders frozen out in a going-private transaction may receive less than the shareholders not frozen out; managers who personally exploit a corporate opportunity may prosper relative to others. In each case one might argue that the
gains should be distributed more widely. Such "sharing" arguments are
popular among academic lawyers, and courts are beginning to apply these
arguments to some corporate control transactions. We argue, in contrast,
that those who produce a gain should be allowed to keep it, subject to the
constraint that other parties to the transaction be at least as well off as
before the transaction. Any attempt to require sharing simply reduces the
likelihood that there will be gains to share.
The traditional rule of judicial deference to the arrangements adopted
by shareholders and managers still governs in some kinds of transactions.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
"#" Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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For example, owners of controlling shares may sell at a substantial premium, without any obligation to share the bounty with other shareholders.' Managers may arrange to take a corporate opportunity for themselves, with the consent of the directors, or may allocate an opportunity
for a family of connected corporations to the firm that can make the most
profitable use of it.2 Mergers that are set up in arms' length bargaining
may distribute the lion's share of the gain to one party, even though both
parties to the merger are controlled by the same people.' These rules have
proved hardy, despite incessent challenge. 4 At the same time, however,
courts have held that a controlling shareholder may not enter into certain
profitable transactions, not involving the sale of control, unless the profits
are shared with other shareholders.' State and federal restrictions effectively require tender offerors to share much of the gain with the managers
and shareholders of acquired corporations. 6 And a recent series of cases in
of gains in parent-subsidDelaware may be read as requiring the sharing
7
iary mergers and going-private transactions.
1. E.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1981); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings,
48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E.2d 387 (1979); Tryon v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951). But see
infra pp. 716-19.
2. E.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970). Things may (or may not) be
different if a particular allocation can be characterized as a waste of corporate assets, a transaction for
which unanimous consent has been required. Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512 (Del. Ch. 1979).
3. E.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), afTd, No. 58, 1981 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982).
4. For representative statements of the criticism, see A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 217-19 (rev. ed. 1967); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION 308-11 (1976); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportuity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The IntrinsicIllegitimacy, 47 TEX L. REV. 215 (1969); Berle, The Price of Power. Sale of Corporate Control,50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Berle, "Control" in CorporateLaw, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Corporate FairShares]; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of CorporateFrezeouts, 87
YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CorporateFreezeouts]; Brudney & Clark, A New Look
At Corporate Opportunities,94 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1981); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Chazen, FairnessFrom A FinancialPoint of
View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third Party Sale Value" the AppropriateStandard?
36 BUS. LAW. 1439 (1981); Greene, CorporateFreeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 487 (1976); Hazen, Transfers of CorporateControl and Duties of ControllingShareholders,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (1977).
5. E.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rep. 592 (1969).
6. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers], for a summary. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive
Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, The Market for Corporate Control,and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1978).
7. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najar, 407
A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). But see Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 432 A.2d
1198 (Del. 1981); Fins v. Pearlman, 424 A.2d 305 (Del. 1980); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413
A.2d 137 (Del. 1980); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), atfd, No. 58, 1981
(Del. Feb. 9, 1982).
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We suggest a coherent approach to the allocation of gains in these
transactions. In Part I we argue that the legal system should supply rules
that mimic the ex ante agreements shareholders would reach if they could
bargain for and enforce their agreements costlessly. We demonstrate in
Part II that all shareholders can benefit from rules that allow the party
responsible for a gain to allocate to himself as much as he can. If so, then
shareholders would vote unanimously for such an allocation rule in advance of the transaction in question, and the rule should be upheld by the
courts. In Part III we apply this approach to a number of corporate control transactions and show that, for the most part, the traditional rules of
corporation law are consistent with our analysis. We conclude in Part IV
with a comparison between the rules governing corporate control transactions and the legal rules in other contexts.
I.

The Function of Fiduciary Duties

Corporate directors and other managers are said to be fiduciaries, who
must behave in certain upright ways toward the beneficiaries of fiduciary
duties. Yet, as Justice Frankfurter put it, "to say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?"8 In this section
we provide a framework for analyzing the meaning and scope of the duty
owed by corporate managers.
Fiduciary principles govern agency relationships. An agency relationship is an agreement in which one or more persons (the principal) delegates authority to another person (the agent) to perform some service on
the principal's behalf. The entire corporate structure is a web of agency
relationships. Investors delegate authority to directors, who subdelegate to
upper managers, and so on. Delegation of authority enables skilled managers to run enterprises even though they lack personal wealth, and it
enables wealthy people to invest even though they lack managerial skills.
It reduces the risks that investors must incur, because it enables them to
spread investments among many enterprises. Delegation also helps managers to pool enough capital to take advantage of available economies of
scale in production, to reduce the costs of bargaining and contracting, and
to obtain the benefits of productive information that must be used in secret
or not at all.'
8. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
9. Because the use of information by one entity does not preclude its use by another entity, it often
is necessary to extend the scope of the firm in order to take advantage of new productive information.
Otherwise the firm's rivals would take a free ride on the efforts involved in creating the information.
See Easterbrook, Insider Trading,Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,and the Productionof Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federaland State
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Delegation-including the "separation of ownership and control"-exists because both principal and agent share in the benefits of
agency relationships. Nonetheless, the interests of agents may diverge
from the interests of principals after the delegation has occurred. Directors
and other managers often hold only a small stake in the firm and thus
capture only a small part of the gains from their efforts; correspondingly,
they suffer through the stock market only a small part of the losses they
create. The smaller the managers' share in the enterprise, the more the
managers' interest diverge from the interests of the principals. This phenomenon exists in any agency relationship. For example, a real estate
agent on a five percent commission will not undertake even $10 worth of
effort to improve the realized price by $100, because the agent reaps only
$5 of this sum. The $10 effort, however, would be highly advantageous to
the principal.
This divergence of interests between principals and agents may be controlled by the operation of the employment market. An unfaithful or indolent agent may be penalized by a lower salary, and a diligent agent may
be rewarded by a bonus for good performance. In addition, the threat of
sales of corporate control induces managers to perform well in order to
keep their positions. Finally, competition in product markets helps to control agents' conduct, because a poorly-managed firm cannot survive in
competition with a well-managed firm (other things being equal).
Although these market mechanisms automatically reduce the divergence
of interests between agents and principals,"' they do not eliminate the
costs of the agency relationship. They do not work without extensive, and
costly, monitoring, so that principals and others know how well the agents
perform.1' And the mechanisms may be inadequate to deal with one-time
defalcations, when the agent concludes that the opportunities of the moment exceed any subsequent penalties in the employment market.
Investors might try to deal with these problems by hiring full-time
monitors to look over the shoulders of managers, but this is costly and
does not deal with the question, "Who monitors the monitors?" Full-time
monitors become managers themselves, in all but name, and monitors who
do not work full time lack both the incentive to watch carefully and the
information to determine how well others are performing their tasks.
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 382-87 (1980); Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
10. See R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). We discuss many of these
market mechanisms in more detail in Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers, supra
note 6, at 1168-74.
11. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Smith & Warner, On FinancialContracting.An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
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The fiduciary principle is an alternative to direct monitoring. It replaces prior supervision with deterrence, much as the criminal law uses
penalties for bank robbery rather than pat-down searches of everyone entering banks. Acting as a standard-form penalty clause in every agency
contract, the elastic contours of the fiduciary principle reflect the difficulty
that contracting parties have in anticipating when and how their interests
may diverge.
Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors
and agents would strike if they were able to dicker at no cost. Such rules
preserve the gains resulting from the delegation of authority and the division of labor while limiting the ability of agents to further their own interests at the expense of investors. The existence of such "off-the-rack"
rules reduces the costs of transacting and of enforcing restrictions on the
agent's powers. It also reduces the risk that managers will manipulate the
articles of incorporation to their advantage once they assume control."
Fiduciary principles contain anti-theft directives, constraints on conflict
of interest, and other restrictions on the ability of managers to line their
own pockets at the expense of shareholders. But these principles have limits that reflect the distinction between managerial practices that harm investors' interests and practices that simultaneously benefit managers and
investors. For example, managers of a corporation are free to funnel business to another corporation in which they have an interest if the transaction is approved by disinterested directors or is "fair" (advantageous) to
the firm."
Because the fiduciary principle is fundamentally a standard term in a
contract to which investors are parties, it makes little sense to say that
managers may, consistent with the fiduciary principle, sacrifice the interests of investors to other ends, so long as investors are not hurt "too
much."' 4 Presumably "too much" in this context means "by so much that
investors start contracting around the rule." Such re-contracting may be
exceedingly costly, however, because once a firm has been established
shareholders have no practical way of revising the articles on their own to
overcome intervening legal surprises. To use the fiduciary principle for
any purpose other than maximizing the welfare of investors subverts its
12. Although investors doubtless should foresee the possibility of such manipulations of the bargain, they have great difficulty policing such abuses because no single investor has a sufficient incentive to watch the managers' conduct. See Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers,
supra note 6, at 1170-71, 1180-82.
13. The fiduciary duty of a corporate director diverges sharply from the fiduciary duty of a trustee
in this respect precisely because the interests of the principals are different. R. WINTER, supra note
10, at 33.
14. See Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980)
(critical discussion of one suggestion along those lines).
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function by turning the high costs of direct monitoring-the reason fiduciary principles are needed-into a shield that prevents investors from controlling their agents' conduct.'IL

Equal Treatment, Fiduciary Duty, and Shareholders' Welfare

Many scholars, and a few courts, conclude that one aspect of fiduciary
duty is the equal treatment of investors. Their argument takes the following form: fiduciary principles require fair conduct; .equal treatment is fair
conduct; hence, fiduciary principles require equal treatment. The conclusion does not follow. The argument depends upon an equivalence between
equality and fair treatment, which we have questioned elsewhere. 6 To
say that fiduciary principles require equal (or even fair) treatment is to
beg the central question-whether investors would contract for equal or
even roughly equal treatment."
Our analysis of this question requires that a distinction be drawn between rules that maximize value ex ante and actions that maximize the
returns of certain investors ex post. A simple example illustrates the point.
A corporation may choose to invest its capital in one of two ventures.
Venture 1 will pay $100, and the returns can be divided equally among
the firm's investors. Thus, if there are 10 investors in the firm, the expected value to each investor is $10. Venture 2 will pay $150, in contrast,
but only if the extra returns are given wholly to five of the ten investors.
Thus, five "lucky" investors will receive $20 apiece, and the unlucky ones
$10. Because each investor has a 50 percent chance of being lucky, each
15. In saying this we do not necessarily rule out arguments that directors owe fiduciary duties to
employees and other groups. Under some circumstances employees are investors in the firm; they
invest their human capital, to the extent that they become specialists and obtain skills that are less
valuable to other employers. Firms recognize this investment with long term contracts, pension plans,
severance payments, and other devices for "repaying" human capital once it is withdrawn from the
firm. But fiduciary duties to employees, like fiduciary duties to other investors, are implied contractual
terms; there is little warrant for manipulating fiduciary principles to override explicit contractual
terms or for using them to achieve ends other than the probable result of cost-free bargaining. We
need not pursue the point. The corporate control transactions we discuss in this article involve conflicts among shareholders, not divergences of interest between employees and shareholders, consumers
and shareholders, or any other conflict.
16. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 323-30; Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 331, 342-43 (1980);
Fischel, supra note 6, at 10-15.
17. Lawyers beg this question with regrettable frequency. As George Stigler observed: "Since the
fairness of an arrangement is a large factor in the public's attitude toward it, the lawyers as representatives of the public seek to give their schemes the sheen of justice. They employ to this end two
approaches. One is to invoke any widely-held belief-on the tacit but convincing ground that any
position is invulnerable against nonexistent attack." Fairness is an invulnerable position; who is for
unfairness? But for lawyers fairness is "a suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses
to blend his own type of justice." Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the
Scholars, I J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2, 4 (1972).
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would think Venture 2 to be worth $15.18 The directors of the firm should
choose Venture 2 over Venture 1 because it has the higher value and
because none of the investors is worse off under Venture 2.
Now consider Venture 3, in which $200 in gains are to be divided
among only five of the ten investors with nothing for the rest. If investors
are risk neutral, fiduciaries should choose Venture 3 over Venture 2 (despite the fact that some investors end up worse off under Venture 3),
because the expected value to each investor is $20 under Venture 3 and
only $15 under Venture 2.
In sum, if the terms under which the directors obtain control of the firm
call for them to maximize the wealth of the investors, their duty is to
select the highest-paying venture and, following that, to abide by the rules
of distribution. If unequal distribution is necessary to make the stakes
higher, then duty requires inequality. The ex post inequality under Ventures 2 and 3 is no more "unfair" than the ex post inequality of a lottery,
in which all players invest a certain amount but only a few collect. The
equal treatment of the investors going into Ventures 2 and 3, and the
gains they receive from taking chances, make the ex post inequality both
fair and desirable.1
We hope that our analysis of Ventures 2 and 3 above are uncontroversial. If corporate control transactions sufficiently resemble Ventures 2 and
3, this analysis supplies a guide for analyzing the fiduciary duties of corporate managers. A class of control transactions resembles Ventures 2 and
3 if: (1) control changes and financial restructurings produce gains for
investors to enjoy; (2) the existence or amount of the gain depends upon
unequal distribution; and (3) shareholders would prefer the unequal distribution to a more equal distribution of smaller gains from an alternative
transaction (or no transaction). We address these issues in the remainder
of Part II and conclude by advancing a fiduciary principle under which
managers always are free to engage in transactions resembling Venture 2.
For practical reasons, however, our principle prohibits transactions resembling Venture 3.
18. See infra pp. 712-13 (discussing relevance of risk aversion).
19. The firm's managers could not easily justify a choice of Venture 2 or 3, followed by a "surprise" equal distribution of the proceeds among the 10 investors. In the example we posed, the firm
obtained the higher returns only by agreeing to unequal distribution. It might get away with a breach
of these conditions once, but Ventures 2 and 3 or their equivalent soon would become unavailable.
Besides, if the firm promises to pay some investors unequally when it undertakes the venture, the
managers could not be "fair" to the unlucky investors without being unfair to the lucky ones. See
Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 955-60 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (fiduciary duties
require managers to abide by bargains and disregard considerations of fairness), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 506 (1981).

704
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A.

The Potential Gains from Control Transactions

It should be clear that managers do not always maximize the wealth of
investors. We have already discussed the costs of principal-agent relationships. Because managers have only a small stake in the fortunes of the
firm, these costs may be quite high. Managers may not work as hard as
they would if they could claim a higher share of the proceeds-they may
consume exessive perquisites, and they may select inferior projects for the
firm without bearing the consequences of their action. Corporate control
transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers obtain control of
the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing
managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in management,
increase the wealth of investors.20
The sale of a control bloc of stock, for example, allows the buyer to
install his own management team, producing the same gains available
from a tender offer for a majority of shares but at lower cost to the buyer.
Because such a buyer believes he can manage the assets of a firm more
profitably, he is willing to pay a premium over the market price to acquire control. The premium will be some percentage of the anticipated
increase in value once the transfer of control is effectuated. If there were
no anticipated increase in value, it would be irrational for the buyer to
pay the premium. There is a strong presumption, therefore, that free
transferability of corporate control, like any other type of voluntary exchange, moves assets to higher valued uses.
Other transactions present similar opportunities for gain. The freezeout
of minority shareholders may create gains when it facilitates a takeover.
Transfers of control are expensive, and apart from the obvious cost of the
premium over the market price necessary to induce the sale of control, the
purchaser must invest considerable sums in research to determine which
firms can be operated profitably after a shift in control. Transfers of control will occur only if the purchaser believes it can recoup these costs.
Recoupment is difficult. Although the purchaser benefits if the share
prices of the target firin appreciate after the transfer in control, this gain
accrues equally to shareholders who did not sell to the purchaser. By
eliminating free-riding shareholders in a freezeout, the purchaser may
recoup the costs of the acquisition by appropriating the gains from the
transfer of control. Such a freezeout clearly increases expected aggregate
shareholders' wealth if it increases the likelihood of a profitable transfer of
20. Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 1168-88. For related
arguments about the sources of gains in corporate control changes, see Borden, Going Private-Old
Tort, New Tort, or No Tort? 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 987, 1006-13 (1974); CorporateFairShares, supra
note 4, at 308; Carney, FundamentalCorporateChanges, Minority Shareholders,and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 69.
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control.
In addition, a freezeout of minority shareholders in a longstanding subsidiary will produce gains if the value of the combined entity is greater
than the sum of the separate values of the parent and the subsidiary. Such
an increase in value may be attributable to economies of scale, centralized
management and corporate planning, or economies of information. Moreover, a freezeout of the minority shareholders of a subsidiary is beneficial
if it reduces the cost of policing conflicts of interest and enables the firm to
make additional cost-justified investments. A parent may not send new
projects to a subsidiary, for example, if the parent's investors must guarantee loans to finance the projects. Under these circumstances, the parent's
investors bear a proportionally greater risk of loss than the minority
shareholders in the subsidiary, but they do not receive a proportionally
greater share of any gains. Thus, the elimination the minority shareholders can increase the likelihood that profitable new ventures will be
undertaken.21
Other control transactions attack agency costs directly. Although public
ownership of a firm may be value-maximizing at one time, changes in the
firm's line of business or financial structure may make it worthwhile for
the firm to "go private" later. When firms go private they eliminate-or
substantially reduce-the separation of ownership and control that creates
the clash of interest between principal and agent. Other things being
equal, the lower agency costs mean higher returns to investors.22 In addition, going-private transactions may eliminate costs attributable to public
ownership, which include substantial (and increasing) expenditures for legal and auditing fees, stockholder relations and compliance with myriad
disclosure obligations mandated by the SEC and organized stock exSchanges. 21 By going private, the firm can avoid these costs of compliance
and reduce the risk of liability resulting from failure to comply with uncertain disclosure obligations. Moreover, the avoidance of disclosure obligations can benefit the firm if it might have to sacrifice prospective busi24
ness opportunities if disclosure were required.
Similarly, the allocation of a "corporate opportunity" to a corporate
insider may allow that opportunity to be exploited more effectively or at
lower cost. The firm incurs substantial agency costs in the exploitation of
21. Cf infra pp. 733-35 (discussing allocation of corporate opportunities).
22. Indeed, greater concentrations of control in public corporations may be associated with higher
profits. See DeAlessi, Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership in Large Corporations,28 J.
FIN. 839 (1973); Stano, Executive Ownership Interests and CorporatePerformance, 42 S. ECON. J.
272 (1975).
23. See S. PHILLIPS & R. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981).
24. See Easterbrook, supra note 9; Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA.
L. REV. 699 (1981); Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 9; Kitch, supra note 9.
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the opportunity because managers, who cannot capture the gains, lack the
appropriate incentives. Managers who assign opportunities to themselves
can appropriate a greater portion of the marginal gains from their efforts,
and thus they have a greater incentive to produce such gains. The manager can compensate the firm by taking a lower salary and bonus, and the
reduction in agency costs may be mutually beneficial.
Of course, some control transactions do not produce gains. In a few
instances changes in control may be attributable to self-aggrandizement of
buyers rather than to gains in the use of the acquired firms' assets. 21 We
do not think this managerialist explanation of control shifts is important
in designing legal rules. If one firm wants to squander its money by paying too much for control, managers have no duty to turn the money away;
an auctioneer does not stop the auction at the "right" price in order to
protect bidders from paying too much. The market penalizes buyers who
pay too much money for a deal, and those losses serve as signals to future
buyers. The corporate law can ignore overpayments, for they are self2
deterring. '
Some corporate control transactions that do not produce gains, however,
are not always self-deterring. Looting may explain certain transfers of
control. Some going-private transactions may be motivated by a desire to
exploit inside information rather than to reduce agency costs. And sometimes a manager may appropriate control of a corporate opportunity even
though the firm would have been able to exploit the opportunity more
profitably.
At least for publicly-traded firms, the market offers information that
distinguishes value-increasing control transactions from others in which
looting or mismanagement may be in store. The information is contained
in the price of a firm's shares. If the control change is associated with an
increase in price, the investors apparently do not fear looting or other
harm to the firm. If a syndicate acquires a control bloc of shares, and the
price of the remaining shares rises, relative to the market as a whole, then
the shareholders are betting on the basis of available information that the
new controller will be better for their interests than the old. Precisely the
same reasoning can be used when analyzing whether a manager has appropriated a corporate opportunity that could have been used more profitably by the firm. If the firm's share prices do not fall after the taking of
the corporate opportunity, investors do not believe that they have been
25.

M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 30-33 (1976).

26. We discuss the evidence about the managerialist hypothesis about control shifts in Responses
of a Target's Management to Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 1185-87. See also Fischel, supra note
24, at 710-14 (critical discussion of the managerialist hypothesis). Cf Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategis,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 267-68, 278-80 (1981) (discussion of self-deterring conduct).
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injured. Many studies of these price changes have been made;
they show
27
gains in the overwhelming majority of control transactions.
Fewer price signals are available in going-private transactions, because
such a transaction frequently eliminates public trading of the firm's
shares. Even these transactions, however, leave some traces. If the price
paid to frozen-out shareholders is higher than the price that the shares
commanded before the transaction, the buyer anticipates that the transaction will produce gains. There is little percentage in paying $15 for shares
selling at $10. If the only purpose of the transaction is to eliminate minority shareholders, it is irrational for the controlling shareholder to pay a
premium over the market price. By using corporate assets to pay minority
shareholders more than their shares are worth, the controlling shareholder
will have decreased the value of his own holdings and therefore be worse
off as a result.
All of these observations follow directly from the simple proposition
that investors have no desire to give away their money. If they pay more
for shares after a transaction than before, their dollar votes are a signal of
gain and loss. One can obtain reliable information from the direction of
price changes without necessarily believing that the prevailing price per2
fectly embodies the available knowledge. 1
B.

The Gains May Depend on Unequal Division

In many cases the apportionment of the gain makes little difference to
the success of the transaction. If the gain from taking over a corporation
exceeds the cost incurred by the acquiror, he would be indifferent to who
27. See Responses of a Target's Mangement to Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 1186-88 (discussion of empirical evidence); Schwert, Using FinancialData to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J.
LAW & ECON. 121 (1981) (discussing methods of using stock prices to support inferences about how
transactions affect firms' fortunes).
28. The analysis in the text follows even more directly from the efficient capital market hypothesis, which courts and even the SEC are beginning to accept. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co., 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980) (adjusting damages award to take account of market
changes-case assumed that markets efficiently evaluate stocks' worth), 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978)
(liability opinion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, 600
F.2d 355, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1979) (explicitly adopting efficient capital market hypothesis); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) (same, but
also adopting a "fair shares" conclusion). The SEC's simplification of disclosure and reporting requirements is based on the belief that the price of widely-traded securities captures the import of
information now required to be disseminated more widely. See 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Supp.
(March 10, 1982). The line of cases dispensing with the reliance requirement under Rule 10b-5 and
adopting the "fraud on the market" theory also rests on the belief that markets efficiently incorporate
information in price-including fraudulent information, which inflates the price and harms the investor even if he never heard or saw the fraudulent statement. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1981); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976);
In re LTV Securities Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981). These cases are discussed in Fischel,
The Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities
(unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal).
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receives the premium that is necessary to obtain control. But the fact that
apportionment is irrelevant to the acquiror in many cases does not mean
that apportionment of gains is always immaterial-in some marginal cases
apportionment is the decisive factor. Suppose that a prospective acquiror
of control concludes that, by expending $10, he can create a 50 per cent
chance of producing $30 in gains. If the prospective acquiror is risk-neutral, the transaction will go forward because the expected gains of $15
exceed the $10 cost of the transaction. If the fiduciary principle is interpreted to require the prospective acquiror to share the $20 gain in the
event it is realized, however, and absorb the entire loss if the gain is not
realized, the deal may become unprofitable because the costs exceed the
expected gains.
In theory, the law could require sharing of the $5 expected gain, but
courts could not calculate this amount because they could not observe the
ex ante risk of failure. Moreover, a large part of the cost to the acquiror is
an opportunity cost-the money the acquiror could have made by devoting
his talents to other projects. Another cost is the premium required to compensate risk-averse acquirors for risk-bearing. Because it would be difficult or impossible to compute opportunity costs and risk premia in the
context of litigation, it would be difficult or impossible to implement a
sensible sharing rule. Even if opportunity costs could be approximated,
judicial errors would arise, and beneficial control changes would be
stifled."
A sharing requirement also may make an otherwise profitable transaction unattractive to the prospective seller of control. To illustrate, suppose
that the owner of a control bloc of shares finds that his perquisites or the
other amenities of his position are worth $10. A prospective acquiror of
control concludes that, by eliminating these perquisites and other amenities, he could produce a gain of $15. The shareholders in the company
benefit if the acquiror pays a premium of $11 to the owner of the controlling bloc, ousts the current managers, and makes the contemplated improvements. The net gains of $4 inure to each investor according to his
holdings, and although the acquiror obtains the largest portion because he
holds the largest bloc, no one is left out. If the owner of the control bloc
must share the $11 premium with all of the existing shareholders, however, the deal collapses. The owner will not part with his bloc for less
than a $10 premium. A sharing requirement would make the deal unprofitable to him, and the other investors would lose the prospective gain from
29. See Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 1168-80 (observing that managers' defenses against tender offers, which sometimes enable target's shareholders to
receive larger fraction of gains from a control change, reduce number of tender offers and effectiveness
of tender offer process in monitoring managers).
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the installation of better managers."
Other value-increasing transactions would also be deterred by a sharing
requirement. First, as we have noted above, sometimes a purchase of control is profitable to the purchaser only if he can prevent minority shareholders from sharing in the gains. Freezeouts of minority shareholders
after a transfer of control perform precisely this function. Second, if the
controlling shareholder in a going-private transaction or merger of a subsidiary into a parent corporation must underwrite the costs of future
value-increasing transactions and thereby incur a proportionally greater
risk of loss than the minority shareholders in the event expectations are
not realized, the deal may become unprofitable to the controlling shareholder if he must share the gains with minority shareholders if all goes
well. Thus, a sharing principle in these transactions leads to a reduction
in total wealth as people desist from entering into otherwise profitable
transactions.
There are other ways in which the gains from corporate control transactions may depend on unequal distribution. Because investors in the firm
must cooperate to transfer control, sharing creates incentives to "free
ride." In a tender offer, for example, shareholders must tender rather than
hold their shares if the bid is to succeed; in a merger (other than a shortform merger), they must vote favorably rather than abstain. If gains must
be shared equally, however, each shareholder may find it worthwhile not
to cooperate in the transaction. To illustrate, suppose that all of the gains
from a tender offer must be shared equally among the investors in the
target corporation and that, if there is a follow-up merger, non-tendering
shareholders cannot be eliminated for less than the tender offer price.
When a prospective acquiror makes a bid, the investors recognize that the
acquiror can profit only to the extent it causes the value of shares to rise.
If the bidder is offering $50 per share, the reasoning runs, it cannot profit
unless value eventually rises above $50. Under the legal rules assumed
above, it may be rational for every shareholder to spurn the $50 offer and
hope that enough other shareholders tender to make the offer succeed: If
30. The common law recognizes that unequal distribution of gains facilitates the transfer of assets
to higher-valued uses. Someone who discovers a lode of ore need not share the knowledge (and the
profits) with the farmer under whose land the ore lies but may, instead, send an agent to buy the farm
for the going price of farmland. A sharing requirement would lead to less searching for ore and lower
wealth for society. See Leitch Gold Mines v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 1 Ont. 2d 469 (1969). See also
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). Cf Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76,
88-91 (2d Cir. 1981) (a multi-product firm need not share joint costs of production among many
products, because pricing all products at fully distributed cost would reduce alocative efficiency);
Fischel, supra note 6, at 9-26 (analysis of how disclosure obligations of Williams Act decrease incentive of bidders to produce valuable information); Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of Information, 13
BELL J. ECON. 36 (1982); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472
(1980).
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there is a follow-up merger, the "fair" price cannot be less than $50 for
the untendered shares. If there is no follow-up merger, the shareholder
expects the price to exceed $50. Each shareholder, in other words, may
attempt to take a free ride on the efforts of the bidder and other shareholders. To the extent free riding prevails, it reduces the chance that the
beneficial transaction will go forward2
A final reason why the gains from beneficial transactions may depend
on unequal division is that sharifg rules may lead to costly attempts to
appropriate greater parts of the gains. The appropriation problem arises
because most gain-sharing rules do not produce completely predictable results-it is difficult to determine the "fair" price. If all investors are entitled to a "fair" share of the bounty, each will find it advantageous to'
claim as much as possible and fight for his claim. He would spend as
much as a dollar, on the margin, to claim another dollar of the benefits. It
is possible for a substantial part of the gain to be frittered away, therefore,
as claimants attempt to make the argument that they are entitled to
more. 2 Fear for this eventuality may cause otherwise beneficial control
transactions to fall through; in any event resources will be wasted in litigation or other skirmishings.
C.

Investors Prefer the FiduciaryPrinciple That Maximizes Aggregate
Gains

Do investors prefer a larger pie even if not everyone may have a larger
slice in every case? We argue here that they do, for two reasons. First,
their expected wealth is greatest under this interpretation of the fiduciary
principle, and second, they may deal with any risk by holding diversified
portfolios of investments.
Clearly, if control transactions produce gains, and if the gains depend
on unequal allocation, then the expected wealth of the shareholders in the
aggregate is maximized by a rule allowing unequal allocation. All share
prices ex ante will be highest when the probability of a value-increasing
transaction in the future is the greatest. Shareholders can realize this
value at any time by selling their shares, or they can hold the shares and
31. See Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980); Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Offers, supra
note 6, at 1173-75 & n.33.
32. The same problem arises whenever there are profits to which several parties can stake-or
create-plausible claims. See, e.g., Hirshleifer & Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Informaion: An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 1389-91 (1979); Posner, The Social Costs of
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Spence, Job Market Signalling, 97 Q. J.
ECON. 355 (1973). Markets usually devise antidotes for such rent-seeking expenditures. See Barzel,
Some Fallaciesin the Interpretationof Information Costs, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 291 (1977). A rule of
corporation law allowing unequal division of gains in control transactions is one such response.
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take the chance of gaining still more as a result of the unequal allocation
of gains ex post.
This argument may seem to disregard the fact that many investors are
risk averse-they prefer a sure $10, say, to a one in ten chance of receiving $100. On the surface, therefore, it seems that investors might benefit
from equal or fair division of gains notwithstanding the loss of some gains
as a result. This argument, however, ignores the lessons of modern portfolio theory. By investing in many firms simultaneously, risk averse investors can reduce the risk of losses without extinguishing profitable-butrisky transactions.3
There are two kinds of risk: systematic risk, which is common to all
investments in the portfolio (e.g., risk that a change in the interest rate
will affect the value of all equity interests), and unsystematic or diversifiable risk. Risk is diversifiable to the extent that an investor, by investing
in a portfolio containing many separate securities, can insulate himself
from the risk. Suppose, for example, that ten firms bid for a single license
to operate a television station. After the FCC makes the award, the stock
of one firm will be worth $100 per share, and the stock of the other nine
firms will be worthless. Each investment, standing alone, is very risky.
But a shareholder can purchase one share in each of the ten firms, and
this portfolio of investments will be worth $100 with certainty.
It is difficult to find firms whose fortunes are so closely intertwined.
Nonetheless, diversification is highly useful in reducing risk because even
an imperfectly negative correlation between the risks of different firms
will dampen the volatility of the portfolio as a whole. An investor holding
a diversified portfolio of New York Stock Exchange firms would barely
notice the wreck of the Penn Central-not only because Penn Central
stock would be a small part of the portfolio but also because bad news for
the Penn Central is good news for the Chesapeake and Ohio.
The risks involved in corporate control transactions are diversifiable.
Corporate control transactions are pervasive. There are mergers, takeovers, freezeouts, tender offers, going-private transactions and related
events in abundance. Indeed, there is a strongly negative correlation
among the risks. An investor with a reasonably diversified portfolio would
be on the winning side of some transactions and the losing side of others.
For example, if shareholders of one corporation obtain little of the gain
from a given merger, the shareholders of the other corporation obtain
33. There is a burgeoning literature on the theory of portfolio management. For a succinct and
lucid description, see Langbein & Posner, supranote 14, at 77-83. More complete discussion of diversification may be found in J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVI.
DENCE 171-256 (1973); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM.
BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1.
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more. An investor holding a diversified portfolio with stock in both corporations is concerned with the total gain from the transaction, not with how
the gain is allocated. Indeed, the investor with shares of both would see
any expense in allocating the gain as pure loss. To the extent an unequal
allocation raises the number and amount of gain transactions, therefore,
investors with diversified portfolios would prefer to allow the unequal allocation to continue.
Diversification is available at remarkably low cost. In fact, it is less
expensive to hold a diversified portfolio of investments than to hold an
undiversified one, because diversification allows investors to avoid the expenses of investigating, picking, and trading stocks. Investors with little
personal wealth can diversify by purchasing shares of mutual funds,
which hold representative samples of stocks, mortgages, and many other
investment vehicles.
The existence of diversification-not its employment-supports our argument for allowing the gains from corporate control transactions to be
apportioned unequally. The availability of diversified investment portfolios means that investors who seek shelter from risk can find it, at low
cost. Others may elect to take greater risks in pursuit of larger gains, just
as they may elect to hold only one risky stock. Perhaps they will become
fabulously wealthy, but if they do not they will have little claim that they
were treated inequitably. Any attempt to set fair prices for corporate control transactions, in the name of protecting investors who choose not to
diversify, penalizes other investors who eliminate risk through diversification, and in the process it reduces the number of value-increasing control
transactions.
We have shown that the ex post inequality under Ventures 2 and 3,
like the ex post inequality in a lottery, is not "unfair" if, ex ante, all
investors have an equal chance to win and can eliminate risk through
diversification. We now consider a potential objection to this reasoning.
One might argue that this ex ante equality is absent in corporate control
transactions because insiders systematically benefit at the expense of outsiders. Small shareholders, the argument runs, consistently will be frozen
out, deprived of control premiums, and otherwise disadvantaged by
insiders.
The argument loses its plausibility on close examination. One need not
be wealthy to be on the "winning side" of a control transaction, and
neither wealth nor status as an insider ensures being a winner. If corporation A purchases from corporation B a control block of shares in corporation C, a small (or outside) shareholder might participate in the gains by
holding shares in any of the three firms. Similarly, if corporation D
merges with corporation E (its long-held subsidiary) and freezes out the
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minority shareholders of corporation E, these shareholders may participate in the gains by holding shares of corporation D. Small shareholders
also may participate in the gains resulting from tender offers, going private transactions, allocation of a corporate opportunity to a parent rather
than a subsidiary, and other types of corporate control transactions, simply by holding shares in the firm that produces the gains. There is no
need for the small shareholder to identify these situations in advance. By
holding a diversified portfolio containing the securities of many firms, the
small shareholder can ensure that he will participate in the gains produced. All shareholders therefore have a chance of receiving the gains produced by corporate control transactions-if not an equal chance, at least
enough of a chance to allow diversification of the risk. There remain cases
in which it is impossible for an investor to share in gains or diversify
away the risk by holding stock in both firms. This would be true, for
example, where one of the firms is privately held. The shareholder can
minimize this non-diversifiable risk, however, by not investing in firms
that are controlled by an individual or a privately-held firm.
D.

Market Value as a Benchmark Under the FiduciaryPrinciple

In the circumstances we have discussed, shareholders unanimously prefer legal rules under which the amount of gains is maximized, regardless
of how the gains are distributed.' The ideal transaction is one like Venture 2 above, in which the gains are unequally distributed but all shareholders are at least as well off as they were before the transaction. Shareholders may also benefit from transactions in which the distribution of
gains leaves some shareholders worse off than before the transaction-as
in Venture 3-but there are probably few such transactions. We cannot
imagine why gains would depend on making some investors worse off,
and we have not encountered any example of such a transaction. In a
world of costly information, investors will view Venture 2 transactions
very differently from Venture 3 transactions, which would raise all-butinsuperable difficulties in determining whether the transaction produced
gain. One can imagine instances, of which looting is a good example, in
which the person acquiring control pays a premium to some investor(s) in
order to obtain control and obliterate the remaining claims, recouping the
premium without putting resources to a more productive use. A require34. The formal conditions for unanimous assent are set out in DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1981). Some of the formal conditions (e.g., spanning-a complete
range of investments-and costless information) are not satisfied in real markets. Nonetheless, as Eugene Fama and Merton Miller have observed, unanimity is often fairly inferable even when the
formal conditions cannot be fully satisfied. E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 17678 (1972).
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ment that all investors receive at least the market value of their positions
prior to the transactions would be a useful rule-of-thumb for separating
beneficial deals from potentially harmful ones. If every investor receives at
least what he had before, and some receive a premium, the transaction
must produce gains.
The requirement that everyone receive at least the value of his investment under existing conditions serves much the same function as the rule
against theft. A thief might be able to put stolen resources to a better use
than his victim, but if so then he can pay for those resources. Thus, a
requirement of payment increases the likelihood that transactions are
value-increasing. Moreover, the proscription of theft also reduces the incentive of property owners to take elaborate precautions against theft. For
example, investors might resort to costly monitoring devices to reduce the
chance of confiscation of their shares. When all transactions are consensual, these precautions become unnecessary. By prohibiting confiscation,
therefore, the fiduciary principle reduces wasteful expenditures while simultaneously reducing the number of socially inefficient corporate control
transactions."
III.

The Fiduciary Principle in Operation

Investors' welfare is maximized by a legal rule that permits unequal
division of gains from corporate control changes, subject to the constraint
that no investor be made worse off by the transaction. In essence, this is a
straightforward application of the Pareto principle of welfare economics.
In this section of the article we examine the corporate law doctrines and
scholarly commentaries that apply to several kinds of control transactions.
We find that the cases and statutes by and large mirror the economic
principles that we have discussed. We sketch the area of congruence and
criticize the few cases (and many scholarly essays) that adopt a different
approach.
A.

Sales of Control Blocs

Sales of controlling blocs of shares provide a good example of transactions in which the movement of control is beneficial. The sale of control
35. A rule against confiscation would be created by contract even if it were not part of existing
law. Whoever controlled a corporation would find it advantageous to insert an anti-confiscation provision in the articles of incorporation. If he did not, the firm could not expect to receive much for its
shares. New shareholders would fear confiscation and would take (expensive) steps to protect their
interest. Because no firm has monopoly power over investment opportunities, the expected costs of
these precautions would reduce by an equal amount the price that purchasers would be willing to pay.
Thus the sums that the controlling party receives would reflect the costs created by the risk of confiscation. Cf. Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Law and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 (1980)(analyzing
consequences and incentive effects of disclosure regulations).
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may lead to new offers, new plans, and new working arrangements with
other firms that reduce agency costs and create other gains from new business relationships. The premium price received by the seller of the control
bloc amounts to an unequal distribution of the gains. For the reasons we
have discussed, however, this unequal distribution reduces. the costs to
purchasers of control, thereby increasing the number of beneficial control
transfers, and increasing the incentive for inefficient controllers to relinquish their positions.
Numerous academic commentators, however, argue for some form of
sharing requirement. 6 Adolph Berle, for example, has argued that control
is a "corporate asset" requiring that premiums paid for control go into the
corporate treasury. 37 Another well-known proposal is the "equal opportunity" rule advocated by Professors Jennings 38 and Andrews.3 This proposal would entitle the minority shareholders to sell their shares on the same
terms as the controlling shareholder.
Both of these proposed treatments of the control premium would stifle
transfers of control. If the premium must be paid into the corporate treasury, people may not consent to the sale of a controlling bloc; if minority
shareholders may sell on the same terms as the controlling shareholder,
bidders may have to purchase more shares than necessary, possibly causing the transaction to become unprofitable. Minority shareholders would
suffer under either rule, as the likelihood of improvements in the quality
of management declined.
The mountain of academic commentary calling for some type of sharing
requirement has not been influential, and the legal treatment of control
sales is largely along the lines of wealth maximization. Sales at a premium are lawful, and the controlling shareholder generally has no duty to
spread the bounty.40 The rhetoric of the cases, however, is not uniform. In
particular, the famous case of Perlman v. Feldmann" suggests that the
gains may have to be shared in some circumstances.
In Perlman the president and chairman (Feldmann) of the board of
36. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 4; Andrews, supra note 4; Bayne, supra note 4;
Berle, supra note 4; Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65
MICH. L. REV. 259 (1967); Hazen, supra note 4; Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactionsin CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. REV 725 (1956); O'Neal,
Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 9
(1976).
37. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 4; Berle, supra note 4.
38. Jennings, supra note 4.
39. Andrews, supra note 4.
40. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 1, Claggett v. Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978);
Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied. 372 U.S. 941 (1963);
Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Ritchie v. McGrath, 1 Kan. App. 2d 481, 571
P.2d 17 (1977).
41. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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Newport Steel, a producer of steel sheets, sold his controlling bloc of
shares for $20 per share at a time when the market price was less than
$12 per share. The purchasers, a syndicate organized as Wilport Company, consisted of end-users of steel from across the country who were
interested in a secure source of supply during a period of shortage attributable to the Korean War.
Because of the war, steel producers were prohibited from raising the
price of steel. The "Feldmann Plan", adopted by Newport and some other
steel producers, effectively raised the price of steel to the market-clearing
price. Under the plan, prospective purchasers provided Newport and
other steel producers with interest-free advances in exchange for commitments for future production. Newport had used those advances to replace
equipment in order to expand and compete more effectively with other
steel producers.
The Second Circuit held in Perlman that the seller of the control bloc
had a duty to share the control premium with other shareholders. The
court's holding that Feldmann could not accept the premium paid by Wilport without violating his fiduciary duty was based on a belief that the
steel shortage allowed Newport to finance needed expansion via the
"Plan", and that the premium represented an attempt by Wilport to divert a corporate opportunity-to secure for itself the benefits resulting
from the shortage. The court stated that "[o]nly if defendants had been
able to negate completely any possibility of gain by Newport could they
'4 2
have prevailed.
There are several problems with this treatment. Foremost is its assumption that the gain resulting from the "Plan" was not reflected in the price
of Newport's stock. Newport stock was widely traded, and the existence of
the Feldmann Plan was known to investors. The going price of Newport
shares prior to the transaction therefore reflected the full value of Newport, including the value of advances under the Feldmann Plan. The Wilport syndicate paid some two-thirds more than the going price and thus
could not profit from the deal unless (a) the sale of control resulted in an
increase in the value of Newport, or (b) Wilport's control of Newport was
the equivalent of looting. To see the implications of the latter possibility,
consider the following simplified representation of the transaction. Newport has only 100 shares, and Wilport pays $20 for each of 37 shares.
The market price of shares is $12, and hence the premium over the market price is $8 x 37 = $296. Wilport must extract more than $296 from
Newport in order to gain from the deal; the extraction comes at the expense of the other 63 shares, which must drop approximately $4.75 each,
42.

Id. at 177.
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to $7.25.
Hence, the court's proposition that Wilport extracted a corporate opportunity from Newport-the functional equivalent of looting-has testable implications. Unless the price of Newport's outstanding shares plummeted, the Wilport syndicate could not be extracting enough to profit. In
fact, however, the value of Newport's shares rose substantially after the
transaction. Part of this increase may have been attributable to the rising
market for steel companies at the time, but even holding this factor constant, Newport's shares appreciated in price. 3 The data refute the court's
proposition that Wilport appropriated a corporate opportunity of
Newport.
It seems, then, that the source of the premium in Perlman is the same
as the source of the gains for the shares Wilport did not buy: Wilport
installed a better group of managers and, in addition, furnished Newport
with a more stable market for its products. The gains from these changes
must have exceeded any loss from abolition of the Feldmann Plan.
Doubtless not all public shareholders have the same good fortune as
those who held Newport Steel. Looting is a profitable transaction under
some circumstances. Existing holders of control, no less than prospective
purchasers, however, have an incentive to put their hands in the til, and a
proposal to ban sales of control at a premium as an antidote to looting is
like a proposal to ban investments in common stocks as an antidote to
bankruptcy.
If it were feasible to detect looters in advance, it might make sense to
put the sellers of control blocs under a duty not to allow shares to pass to
the knaves-certainly the sellers of control can detect knavery at a lower
cost than the public shareholders who are not parties to the transaction.
Indeed, some cases have held that a seller of a control bloc can be liable
43. Charles Cope has computed changes in the price of Newport shares using the market model,
well developed in the finance literature, under which the rate of return on a firm's shares is a function
of the market rate of return, the volatility of the firm's price in the past, a constant, and a residual
component that represents the consequences of unanticipated events. Increases in this residual reflect
good news for the firm. Cope found a significant positive residual for Newport in the month of the
sale to Wilport. See Cope, Is the Control Premium Really a Corporate Asset? (April 1981) (unpublished paper on file with Yale Law Journal).
The raw price data are no less telling. The $12 price to which the Perlman court referred was the
highest price at which shares changed hands before the sale of control. The average monthly bid
prices for Newport stock during 1950 were:
July: 6
August: 8
September: 10 7
October: 12
November: 12 3A
December: 12
The sale to the Wilport syndicate took place on August 31, 1950. This pattern of prices certainly
does not suggest that the 63% interest excluded from the premium perceived any damage to Newport.
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for failing to investigate adequately a prospective purchaser of control."
The wisdom of such holdings is suspect, however, because it is difficult if
not impossible to detect looters as they approach. A looter takes the money
and runs, and looting is by nature a one-time transaction. Once looters
have absconded with the assets of one firm, they acquire a reputation that
prevents them from repeating this act. But when they first obtain control,
they may appear quite innocuous. Any requirement that owners of control
blocs investigate buyers and not sell to suspected looters is equivalent to a
program of preventive detention for people who have never robbed banks
but have acquisitive personalities.
Although sellers could spend substantial sums investigating buyers and
investors still more in litigating about the quality of investigation, and the
result of some investigations would be a refusal to sell, almost all of these
refusals would be false positives. That is, they would be refusals that reduced the gains available from transferring control. Sometimes the best
way to manage a firm is to break it up-to sell off unprofitable operations
and reorganize the rest. Some managers are especially skilled in reorganizing or liquidating seriously ailing firms. Yet it seems likely that the
suspicion of looting would fall most heavily on such people, for it is hard
to say in advance whether a radical restructuring of a firm would be good
or bad for the shareholders. 4 A legal rule that has its greatest bite when a
firm is approached by a buyer with a proposal for radical (and potentially
highly beneficial) surgery is unlikely to increase the value of investments.
We do not suggest that the legal system should disregard looting, but
we think it likely that the best remedies are based on deterrence rather
than prior scrutiny. Looters, when caught, could be heavily fined or imprisoned, taking into account the frequency with which looting escapes
detection. Penalties for looting could be made high enough to be effective.
The costs of deterrence are probably much lower than the costs of dealing
with looting through a system of prior scrutiny that would scotch many
valuable control shifts as a byproduct.
44. E.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Financial Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1941);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1941).
45. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Oh. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964), in which the family controlling Holland Furnace Co. refused to sell to Maremont, arguing that Maremont had an unsavory
reputation as a liquidator of other firms. Holland bought Maremont's shares at a premium price, to
the dismay of most of Holland's shareholders. After fending off Maremont's bid for control, Holland
steadily went downhill. Its woes are spelled out in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 677-78
(5th ed. 1980). The management of a corporation quite frequently resists a takeover bid on the
ground that the prospective buyer would reorganize or liquidate the firm - as if the firm had a
"right to life" at the expense of the investors.
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Changes in Control Structure

A variety of practices may affect the way in which investments are
pooled to obtain or hold control. Voting trusts, holding companies, and
many other devices allocate control as effectively as the sale of control
blocs. These control transactions have the same potential benefits as sales
of controlling stock, and accordingly they should be evaluated the same
way. By and large, the corporate law does so. Shareholders may form
voting trusts and holding companies without any obligation to share the
gains; the only significant limitation, usually imposed by statute, is that
voting trusts lapse unless periodically renewed. This provision, like the
rule against perpetuities, prevents the combination of a dead hand and a
current deadlock from diverting corporate assets into wasteful endeavors.
Again, however, there is an exception to the general rule. In Jones v.
H.F.Ahmanson & Co.," the owners of 85 percent of the stock of United
Savings and Loan Association, a closely held corporation, organized a
Delaware holding company. In exchange for 250 shares of the holding
company, they transferred all of their shares in the savings and loan along
with several other businesses that they owned. The holding company then
went public, issuing both stock and debentures. The former controlling
shareholders of the savings and loan thus held stock in a highly leveraged
holding company, and the position of the minority shareholders of United
was unaffected. In the next few years, the profits of the savings and loan
went up, while the prices of the shares of the leveraged holding company
went up even faster.
The minority shareholders in the savings and loan-acting after the rise
in the holding company's price-demanded admission to the venture. The
controlling shareholders offered them the equivalent of $2,400 per United
share, while the value of United shares placed in the holding company at
the outset had risen to the equivalent of $8,800. The disgruntled minority
shareholders brought suit. The Supreme Court of California, citing Perlman and referring to the gain sharing proposals of Berle and Jennings,
held that "the controlling shareholders may not use their power to control
the corporation for the purpose of promising a marketing scheme that
benefits themselves alone to the detriment of the minority. 4' 7 With respect
to the appropriate relief, the court insisted that "the minority shareholders
be placed in a position at least as favorable as that the majority created for
themselves." 4 The court permitted minority shareholders to elect between
the appraised value of their shares at the time of the exchange and the
46.
47.
48.

1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
1 Cal. 3d at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
1 Cal. 3d at 118, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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economic value of the holding company stock that they would have had at
the time of the action.
At first blush, the case appears to present a classic usurpation of a corporate opportunity-the ability to go public-by the controlling shareholder. Because the majority could have included the minority without
jeopardizing the transaction, there was no need to exclude the minority.
But this interpretation of Ahmanson is unconvincing. The controlling
shareholders in Ahmanson wished to consolidate their 85% stock ownership of the savings and loan with several other businesses in one corporation. Such a consolidation could produce efficiencies, from centralized
management or otherwise. Participation by the minority in the holding
company would decrease the incentive of the controlling shareholders to
create the gains by incurring the costs of consolidating the related businesses.4 9 The California Supreme Court failed to perceive this difficulty
with its sharing requirement.
More fundamentally, the court did not grasp the significance of the minority shareholders' delay in bringing suit. The costs and risks of creating
the holding company were borne by the controlling shareholders, and
their expected reward was the premium resulting from the increased value
of the transformed asset. The minority shareholders bore none of the costs,
and allowing them to "free ride" on the benefits would reduce the number
of value-increasing transactions in the future. Moreover, a substantial
part of the increase in the price of the holding company's shares was attributable to its leverage. The minority shareholders carefully waited to
see whether United's earnings rose before demanding to participate in the
holding company; if United's earnings had fallen, the minority" doubtless
would have held onto their United shares while those who participated in
the holding company were wiped out in favor of the debenture holders. If
generally accepted, the court's ex post view of fairness, giving the minority
a right to participate in the gains without taking the risk of loss, would go
a long way toward discouraging beneficial control transactions.
49. In contrast to the California Supreme Court, the lower court held that no fiduciary duty was
breached. The concurring opinion of Judge Moss cogently articulated the danger of equating fiduciary
duty with a sharing requirement under the facts of Ahmanson:
It is difficult to assess the effect of a rule of fiduciary duty upon the incentives that operate
in our entrepreneurial system of capital formation and development . . The consolidation of
several related businesses under a single top management by means of a holding company in
many cases produces benefits for the constituent companies and their minority shareholders as
well as for the persons who control the holding company . . . The incentive of financiers to
take the risks involved in the formation and financing of a holding company and the acquisition of control of potential subsidiary corporations might well be diminished by a rule that
requires them in the absence of any showing of harm to the subsidiary or to its shareholders to
share the benefits of their enterprise with the minority shareholders of each subsidiary
corporation.
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 293, 303 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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C. Sale of Office
Managers could transfer control by selling their offices. A sale of office
is unlawful in every state, however, in the absence of contractual
permission. 0
This application of the fiduciary principle is usually explained as resting on the belief that
[a] fiduciary endeavoring to influence the selection of a successor
must do so with an eye single to the best interests of the beneficiaries. Experience has taught that, no matter how high-minded a
particular fiduciary may be, the only certain way to insure full compliance
with that duty is to eliminate any possibility of personal
51
gain.
Judge Friendly's sweeping declaration about the lessons of hard experience has more confidence than confirmation behind it. A principle that
personal gains may not influence the transfer of control would proscribe
any sale of control blocs of shares, yet the law universally allows such
sales. It is more accurate to say that the fiduciary principle bans the sale
of office, while allowing the sale of control, because control sales have
built-in guarantees of the buyer's good intentions but office sales do not.
One who buys a controlling bloc of shares cannot hurt the corporation
without hurting himself too. Even a looter cannot gain if he holds a substantial bloc of shares. Those shares would diminish in value as a result of
looting and would be forfeit when the offense was revealed. Substantial
share ownership acts as a bond for honest conduct. One who buys an
2
office may obtain control too cheaply.
The law appears to be consistent with this characterization of the rationale for the rule against selling offices. Managers may agree, as part of
the sale of a controlling block of shares, to turn over their offices.5 3 In such
cases part of the premium reflects the value of the office. Managers also
may accept payment for recommending that the shareholders approve a
50. In general, an agent may not sell his position of authority. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 18 (1958) (restriction on ability of agent to delegate his authority).
51. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1342 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 802 (1972).
52. Offices presumably would sell for their value to the incumbent, including any value attributable to the incumbent's ability to extract profits and perquisites. It is possible to argue that because the
incumbent would insist on full payment for value, only a buyer who could put the firm's assets to
better use would be able to meet the incumbent's demands. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). On this view there is no reason to prohibit the sale of office. But this
would be an accurate assessment only if managers now could fully extract the value of their positions.
As we emphasized in the text, they cannot: markets for control and managerial services constrain
them.
53. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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merger, when the payment is disclosed and the managers simultaneously
sell their own shares.14 The sale of office violates the fiduciary principle
only when the office is sold by itself."5
D.

Freezeout Transactions

Freezeouts of minority shareholders serve a variety of purposes. The
freezeout of minority shareholders soon after a transfer in control allows
the bidder to capture a disproportionate share of the gains from the acquisition; the elimination of minority shareholders in a subsidiary corporation
may facilitate various economies of operation and eliminate conflict of interest problems; going private directly reduces agency costs and the costs
attributable to public ownership.
It used to be very difficult to force a shareholder to disinvest involuntarily, because courts viewed share ownership as a form of vested right that
could not be taken without consent. Because this rule of unanimity created
intolerable holdout problems and frustrated many efficient corporate
transactions, it was ultimately jettisoned in favor of a rule that allowed the
majority to freeze out minority shareholders." Under the modem view,
the shareholders' only entitlement is to demand an appraisal of their
shares, a remedy that does not give dissenting shareholders any element of
value attributable to the transaction from which they dissent. 7
Within the last few years, however, freezeout transactions have come
under greater scrutiny by courts and increasing attack by scholars. It has
been suggested that freezeouts are unfair to the shareholders and lack a
business purpose. Both suggestions find support in the Delaware Supreme
Court's recent decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co."
Development Corp. made a tender offer for the common stock of
Magnavox Co. The initial price was $9 per share, and 84.1 percent of the
stock was tendered. Development then merged Magnavox with T.M.C.
Development, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Development, paying $9 for
every outstanding share. The result of this two-step process was that every
original shareholder of Magnavox received $9 whether or not he tendered,
and Development obtained all of the common stock. Development told the
54. Nelson v. Gammon, 647 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1981).
55. Similarly, shareholders may sell their votes when the sale is coupled with an "interest" (e.g., a
pledge) in stock, but they may not sell their votes if no interest is conveyed. Votes would go too
cheaply if they could be bought, because votes are all but worthless to individual shareholders even
though valuable in the aggregate. See Responses of a Target's Management to Tender Ofiers, supra
note 6, at 1171.
56. See Carney, supra note 20, at 77-97; Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical
Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981).
57. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(h) (1981); infra p. 731.
58. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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non-tendering shareholders that they had the right to appraisal under
Delaware law. Some shareholders, however, spurned the appraisal and
sought an injunction, contending that the merger was unfair and did not
serve a valid business purpose because it allowed Development to keep "a
disproportionate amount of the gain [Development] anticipated would be
recognized from consummation of the merger." 9
Development argued that the shareholders' only right was to the value
of the existing investment, and that this right was fully protected by the
appraisal remedy. The court, however, stated that shareholders had a legally protected right in the form of their investment as well as in its value.
Thus the court held that a trial was necessary on the questions whether
there was a business purpose for the merger, and whether $9 was a fair
price. Because the directors of Magnavox, the nominees of Development,
owed fiduciary duties to the shareholders, the price paid in the freezeout
must satisfy "entire fairness"' 0 as well as the appraisal standard.
We find it hard to follow the court's reasoning. Invocation of the fiduciary principle does not answer the question whether shareholders would
contract for (and fiduciaries thus must provide) some sharing of gains, and
the court begged this central question in Singer. Moreover, after begging
the question, the court left "entire fairness" undefined-the term has no
readily apparent meaning, and the court gave it none. Perhaps the price
must exceed $9 to be entirely fair, but the court did not say so; indeed, it
did not foreclose the possibility that $8 or even $5 would have been entirely fair. It left these matters to the resolution of the chancellor.
Singer is an unsatisfactory case, which may explain why courts in other
states have been hesitant to embrace its holding 61 and why the case has a
checkered career even within Delaware. Although at least one of the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions suggests that Singer requires gain-sharing, 62 the court has held that a merger may be approved when all of the
gain accrues to one firm;63 that the appraisal standard continues to exclude
59. Id. at 978.
60. Id. at 980.
61. See, e.g., Yanow v. Teal Indus., 178 Conn. 262, 422 A.2d 311 (1979) (rejecting Singer outright); Deutsch v. Blue Chip Stamps, 116 Cal. App. 3d 97, 172 Cal. Rptr. 21 (2d Dist. 1981) (apparently rejecting Singer); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977) (adopting modified version
of Singer,holding that courts must inquire into business purpose but may not inquire into entire
fairness). But see Klurfeld v. Equity Enter., 79 App. Div. 2d 124, 436 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (2d Dept. 1981)
(apparently following Singer). For a critique of Singer as well as other recent developments in Delaware corporation law, see Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware CorporationLaw, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 913 (1982).
62. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (applying remedy for perceived
fraudulent statements at time of merger; upper bound of remedy is full value of shares to the acquiring corporation); see also Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982) (favorably
citing Lynch in merger case; holding that majority shareholders have duty not to misrepresent facts in
obtaining approval).
63. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
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elements of value attributable to the transaction that provokes the dissent;" that a case commenced under the banner of Singer may be settled
under the usual appraisal standards;65 and that a shareholder who invokes
the appraisal remedy may not also challenge a merger as "unfair." 66 This
series of cases led Vice Chancellor Brown to declare in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.6 7 that Singer probably did not change the law at all.6 8

Singer's business purpose test also appears to be vacuous. In Tanzer v.
InternationalGeneral Industries,69 the court held that a business purpose
is present if the transaction is beneficial to one of the firms. Thus, the
party implementing the freezeout can assert that gains to itself are the
basis for the transaction. Business purpose is absent only when both parties lose on the deal, a situation that cannot be common. This test actually
is more lax than our fiduciary principle, which requires that no shareholder be made worse off by the deal, and thereby ensures that the transaction produces net gains.
Cases applying the Singer business purpose test illustrate the relationship between the maximization of anticipated gain and our fiduciary principle. One case held, for example, that a firm could freeze out an obnoxious shareholder just because he was a troublemaker; the gains from
freeing the time of managers to run the firm rather than to deal with the
troublemaker supplied the business purpose.7
64. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (pure going-private transaction).
65. Fins v. Pearlman, 424 A.2d 305 (Del. 1980).
66. Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 432 A.2d 1198 (Del. 1981).
67. 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), afi'd, No. 58, 1981 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982).
68. Id. at 1342-43. Vice Chancellor Brown's decision suggests that Singer simply restates the
fiduciary principle as we have described it, with a twist. The acquiring corporation may not offer a
pittance and leave the shareholders with the burden of activating the appraisal remedy. It must, instead, offer as an initial matter whatever price it concludes would be established in appraisal. A
requirement of up-front payment shortens the delay that often attends the appraisal process, and the
shift in the burden relieves individual shareholders, whose interests may be small, of much of the
expense and uncertainty in seeking appraisal. Singer, as Vice Chancellor Brown has construed it,
overcomes the defects often perceived in the appraisal process, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 4, at 6984; CorporateFairShares, supra note 4, at 304-07; Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy:
An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962), but does not require gain sharing. So understood, the "entire fairness" standard of Singer can be reconciled with the fiduciary principle of maximizing shareholders' expected wealth. A preferable method for reducing the expense and uncertainty
of the appraisal remedy, however, would be simply to modify certain rules in appraisal proceedings.
See infra note 96. A modified appraisal rule would give minority shareholders who believed they did
not receive the value of their investment an effective remedy but would not grant them the ability to
frustrate or delay beneficial corporate control transactions by bringing injunctive suits.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Weinberger sheds little light on the matter. The
court recited some of the facts and concluded that the "record justifies the vice chancellor's conclusion
that the cash-out price was fair" (slip op. at 4). The court did not discuss the legal standards informing the fairness decision. Justice Duffy, in dissent, would have characterized the transaction as a
liquidation subject to gain-sharing, but he did not address other questions.
69. 379 A.2d 1121 (1977).
70. Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Delaware law).
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In Dower v. Mosser Industries?' the Third Circuit found a business
purpose when minority shareholders were eliminated in order to increase
the profits of a new venture. Mosser was contemplating an expansion program when it discovered that it could obtain the necessary financing only
if Ecolaire, which owned 93% of Mosser's stock, guaranteed Mosser's obligations. Ecolaire was unwilling to take 100% of the risk in exchange for
93% of the gain, and it decided to freeze out Mosser's minority shareholders. The court found that there was a legitimate business purpose for the
freezeout because Ecolaire's desire to capture all of the gain was itself
legitimate-the fiduciary's desire to avoid sharing supplied the reason for
the transaction. The court clearly adopted the ex ante wealth maximization approach advocated in this paper."
When viewed in its entirety, therefore, the law has not imposed any
general requirement of gain-sharing in freezeout transactions." The
fiduciary principle of maximizing anticipated wealth allows the dominant
stockholder to set the terms of a freezeout, so long as all investors receive
at least the market value of their interests. Moreover, the cases have not
drawn a distinction in this respect between different types of freezeout
transactions.
Nonetheless, numerous commentators have proposed gain-sharing rules
for freezeouts. William Carney, for example, maintains that compensation
of the minority at market value is inadequate because the minority may
74
value its shares more highly than either the majority or the market. If
the minority values its shares at $30 even though the market price is $10,
the argument runs, they may lose more than the majority gains, and the
transaction may decrease value. This argument is flawed, however, because it assumes that different shareholders place different values on the
71. 648 F.2d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law, but decided on assumption
that Delaware law was useful guide).
72.
Ecolaire, which was risking its capital, wanted to reap all of the benefits of its
investment....
The heart of plaintiff's . . . argument is that the elimination of the minority through a
merger is inherently unfair. But the fiduciary duty owed by the majority. . does not prevent
a cash out under Pennsylvania law ....
The defendants in this case established that the price offered for the stock of the minority
holders was the same as that given in a recent arms length transaction. They also showed that
the timing of the merger was related to the planned expansion of Mosser. The plaintiffs allege
that because the proposal has not been carried out, there was fundamental unfairness in the
defendants' assertion that the financing needs of Mosser were a valid business reason. However, the plaintiffs did not show that at the time of the merger there was not intention to
proceed with the project or that it will not be done in the future. Their argument therefore is
not persuasive.
648 F.2d at 189-90. The court's approach is entirely the language of ex ante wealth maximization.
73. But see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.. 922
(1977) (attempt to implement a gain-sharing rule); infra note 80 (discussing Mills).
74. Carney, supra note 20, at 112-18.
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same investment. If this were the case, the minority shareholders (or
others who placed the $30 value on the shares) would purchase the shares
held by the remaining investors. Investors can make mutually beneficial
trades until those holding any given firm's stock have reasonably homogenous expectations about its performance, and there is little risk that the
pessimistic investors in a firm can use freezeout transactions to exploit
optimists."
Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein suggest special sharing rules
for two-step acquisitions. Under their proposal, a follow-up merger is fair
if (a) the bidder's intent to merge is stated at the time of the offer, and (b)
the bidder pays the same price for the shares acquired by merger as it
paid for those tendered.7 6 These conditions, they argue, ensure that gains
are fairly apportioned and that the tender process acts as a surrogate for
an equitable vote on the terms of the acquisition.
Although the tender price has all the earmarks of arms-length bargaining, and the premium over market price shows that the tender offeror
believes he can put the acquired assets to better use, it does not follow that
he should pay the same price for shares acquired later. By ameliorating
the free-rider problem, a two-price offer facilitates transfers of control to
those who can manage assets more effectively." The fiduciary principle of
maximizing shareholders' expected wealth therefore does not interdict
two-price offers. What B'udney and Chirelstein describe as "deception
and 'whipsaw'
under a two-price offer is actually nothing more than
compensation to those who facilitate the movement of control at some
risk." Thus, our fiduciary principle requires no more than that the price
75. The data suggest that investors have uniform expectations. See Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices,45 J. BUS.
179 (1982). See also Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34
J. BUS. 411 (1961).
76. Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 4, at 1359-65.
77. See supra pp. 708-11. DuPont's recent bid for Conoco is an example of how a two-price offer
can be used to address the free-rider problem. DuPont offered $98 per share in cash for 51 percent of
the shares and a stock package worth $77 for any untendered shares (or tendered shares in excess of
51 percent). The two-price structure of the offer induced investors to tender but harmed no one
because everyone had an opportunity to accept the cash price. DuPont's two-price offer was announced explicitly, but the nature of the announcement should not matter. To the extent the fiduciary
principle permits unequal allocation of gains, every offer is a two-price offer: one explicit premium
price, and a second price as low as the governing rule permits. (The bidder may, of course, elect to
pay more; if that were its intention, it could so announce.) See Radol v. Thomas, 14 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 789 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
78. Id. at 1361.
79. Brudney and Chirelstein may have assumed that some shareholders subjectively value the
stock more than the tender price and fear that, if they do not tender at once, they will fare even worse
in a subsequent freezeout. The assertion that shareholders have multiple subjective values for stock,
however, is doubtful. See supra note 75. It is far more likely that those with high estimates of a firm's
value will buy the stock of other investors than that the pessimists will bid for the stock held by
optimists.
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for untendered shares be at least as high as the market price of the target's
stock before news of the tender offer becomes available.
Brudney and Chirelstein also suggest that "fairness" requires any gains
from the merger of a parent corporation and a subsidiary to be calculated
and shared among all investors according to the pre-merger ratio of the
equity investments in the two firms. For the reasons we have covered
above, this proposal also deters value-increasing transactions. Moreover,
the suggestion that sharing promotes "fairness" is dubious. 0 How does
the controlling shareholder know what the gains will be in order to apportion them fairly? How can "synergy gains"-the subject of the Brudney
and Chirelstein sharing proposals-be separated from the ordinary return
on the time, effort and resources that the controlling firm put into accomplishing the merger, or from the opportunity costs of the controlling
shareholder? Must minority shareholders then give back the premium
recieved, or more? What if the merger results in a loss rather than a gain?
Why does fairness require sharing in proportion to equity value rather
than in proportion to total asset value or some other standard? There is
simply no acceptable standard of fairness, which is one more reason why
the cases and our fiduciary principle do not require sharing.8 '
With regard to going-private transactions, 2 some commentators have
80. The Seventh Circuit in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1248 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), attempted to implement the Brudney & Chirelstein gain-sharing proposal in the context of a parent-subsidiary merger. For a critique of Mills, and more generally of the
practical problems with the Brudney & Chireistein proposal, see Lome, A Reappraisalof FairShares
in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 964 n.29, 970-87 (1978). Mills has attracted no
following. Delaware has rejected Mills explicitly, Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382,
394 (Del. Ch. 1979), and the Supreme Court has interpreted federal standards of fairness under the
Investment Company Act to allow unequal allocation in controlled mergers. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
81. Because there is no acceptable standard of fairness, the gain-sharing rule advocated by many
commentators would resurrect some of the costs of the old rule requiring unanimous consent among
shareholders for major corporate changes. That rule was abandoned because it gave every shareholder
a veto that he could use to attempt to extract a larger part of the gains. These efforts were very costly.
Although it might be possible to obtain everyone's consent through extended negotiations, the costs of
these negotiations are wasteful. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 19-27 (1979), for an excellent
description of the problems created by unanimity rules. Firms incorporated in states that did not
require unanimous consent accordingly prospered relative to others. There is little reason to suppose
that the costs of negotiating and litigating a "fair" sharing of gains are significantly less than the costs
of obtaining unanimous consent to major corporate changes. But no matter how the costs compare,
any expenditures that do no more than reshuffle the gains from an existing transaction are wasteful.
The prospect of such expenditures will cause some otherwise beneficial control transactions to fall
through. The prospective acquirer of control will be concerned both about the expenditures involved
in defending its price as fair and about the chance that a court will order it to pay more-perhaps so
much more that the total payments exceed the available gains.
82. Ve do not discuss at length the argument that going-private transactions or other freezeouts
decrease shareholders' wealth by imposing a taxable transaction. In many situations-for example, a
freezeout at a price below the price at which the shares were originally purchased-this will not be
the case. Moreover, the shareholder has no absolute right to control the timing of taxable transactions.
A shareholder may be the subject of a taxable transaction in a liquidation or exchange offer even if he
objects to the transaction.
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taken the extreme position of advocating a flat prohibition. One argument,
heard from the SEC and other sources, is that the freezeout price is unfair, even though above market, when it is below the price at which the
shares were sold to the public.83 The implicit assumption is that insiders
somehow bilked the public into paying too much-or perhaps have confused the market so that the current price is too low-and should not be
permitted to profit by their chicanery. Those who make that argument
both underestimate the efficiency of the stock market and misconceive the
importance of past stock prices. In an efficient capital market, the full
informational value of prior prices is incorporated into today's price, and
the fact that the firm's price was once high does not indicate that it will
rise again.8 4 A freezeout price above the current market price is no less
beneficial to shareholders because the price was once higher, and the person paying the above-market price cannot hope to profit unless the transaction is value-increasing. 8
Another argument against going-private transactions, advanced by
Brudney and Chirelstein, is that "[t]he costs of monitoring management's
conduct are incurred for the benefit of the public stockholders, and it
hardly rests with the fiduciary to cite the saving of those costs as a reason
for terminating the beneficiaries' interest without their consent."8 This
argument confuses monitoring costs with the benefit that monitoring produces. Monitoring may be beneficial on balance, but this does not mean
that the same or greater economic benefit cannot be obtained at lower
expense by going private.8" The firm may go private, realize the savings,
83. Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 4, at 1366; Toms, CompensatingShareholdersFrozen Out
in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 554 n.18, 567-68 (1968); Note, Going Private, 84
YALE L. J. 903, 931 (1975). The SEC has embodied this approach in Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13e-3, 240.13e-100 (1981), which requires that a firm about to go private disclose information
concerning the transaction and state an opinion about the transaction's fairness. Rule 13e-3 thus
requires either a statement that the transaction is unfair (which will lead to an injunction under
Singer) or a statement that the transaction is fair, which can be challenged in federal court as a
material and untrue statement. The damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't quality of the Rule
makes it an obstacle to the achievement of shareholders' welfare. See Note, Regulating Going Private
Transactions:SEC Rule 13e-3, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1980), for a compelling argument that the
Rule is not authorized by statute.
84. For a brief discussion of the efficiency of markets, see Responses of a Target's Management to
Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 1165-68.
85. It might be argued that insiders may be able to pay more than the market price and nevertheless profit even though the transaction is not value-increasing. If insiders could sell to the market at a
high price, mismanage the firm to depress the price, freeze out the public shareholders at a low price
not reflecting the firm's future profitability, and then end the mismanagement, insiders might profit.
The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that insiders can trick the market. Other investors, either
before the attempt to go private or when the going-private transaction itself leaks information to the
market, will analyze what the firm's future prospects are under improved management. If insiders
attempt to go private at a price less than the firm's future prospects indicates, the firm in all likelihood
will be the subject of a higher bid. See infra note 92.
86. Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 4, at 1366.
87. Presumably Brudney and Chirelstein would not outlaw close corporations. But the same con-
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and share them with the former public investors. 8
Brudney and Chirelstein further argue that going private should be
prohibited because such transactions create an unacceptably high chance
that public stockholders will be cheated. They claim that the fiduciary
principle should be interpreted "as not permitting insiders unilaterally to
condemn the stock of public investors . . . no matter how high the condemnation price." 9 ° In other words, Brudney and Chirelstein apparently
argue that the interest of shareholders in receiving more money is irrelevant, and that other interests are more important. Although the argument
appears to be implausible on its face,9" it is difficult to evaluate because
they do not say what other interests are involved, or how important these
might be. They offer no cogent reason why public shareholders should be
consigned to hold their certificates when they can profit as a result of a
value-increasing going private transaction.
Perhaps the hostility to going-private transactions is based on the fear
that the controlling shareholder is exploiting inside information. If a firm
makes a valuable mineral discovery, for example, and this information is
not yet reflected in the price of the firm's shares, a controlling shareholder
might be able to reap a considerable gain by freezing out the minority,
even though the value of the firm is not increased. But this possibility
should not serve as a justification for banning going-private transactions.
First, its likelihood is probably exaggerated. 2 Second, the possibility of
insiders profiting is a well-known risk for which investors can demand
siderations that explain a firm's decision not to go public also may explain a decision in other circumstances to go private-the costs of public ownership outweigh the benefits.
88. Moreover, as we argue above, the sharing can be done prospectively-the chance of obtaining
these gains will be reflected in the price of shares. It is not necessary to spread the gain explicitly
when the firm actually goes private.
89. CorporateFreezeouts, supra note 4, at 1368.
90. Id. at 1367.
91. For a powerful critique of the Brudney and Ohirelstein analysis of going-private transactions,
see Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder
Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1979).
92. In the famous case of Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), for example,
minority shareholders alleged that the controlling shareholder unlawfully attempted a freezeout transaction without disclosing that the value of tobacco, the firm's principal asset, had tripled. The court
held that the planned transaction constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, however, it is very
unlikely that the increase in the price of tobacco, a commodity with a readily ascertainable price, was
really inside information not reflected in the firm's stock price. Zahn makes sense only if the shareholders were unaware of the quantity or kind of tobacco held by the firm, which would be known to
insiders, and then only if the ignorance affected their decision concerning conversion between classes
of shares. Perhaps they were ignorant, but the court did not discuss the problem.
The going-private transaction itself may leak information to the market and thereby decrease the
risk of abuse of inside information. In that case outsiders may be expected to produce a higher bid and
prevent the insiders from buying the firm too cheaply. This happened recently when a syndicate made
a bid of $25 per share for Fuqua Industries, exceeding the management's going-private offer of $20.
See WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1981, at 4, col. 2.

HeinOnline -- 91 Yale L.J. 730 1981-1982

Corporate Control Transactions
compensation."' Finally, there are specific legal rules that prohibit insider
trading. 4 Banning going-private transactions because of the risk of exploitation of inside information would be as irrational as banning sales of
control to prevent looting-the solution is far worse than the problem.
E.

The Appraisal Remedy

Statutes and cases routinely require certain minimum payments to the
investors that are affected by a corporate control transaction. These minimum payments, codified in most states by the appraisal statute, require
that shareholders receive the equivalent of what they give up but do not
require sharing of the gain from the change in control. The Delaware
statute is the most explicit, providing that the court "shall appraise the
shares, determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation" of the event giving rise to
appraisal rights."
The appraisal standard reflects the economic principles we have discussed above.96 The fiduciary principle provides that gains need not be
shared as long as every investor receives at least what he had before. As a
general rule, the fiduciary principle is satisfied if some investors receive a
premium over the market price of their shares, and other investors do not
suffer a loss.
One might argue, however, that reliance on pre-transaction value to
protect investors is inadequate because that value depends on the rules for
corporate control transactions. If the fiduciary principle permits a freezeout of shareholders at a low price, the argument goes, then shares will sell
for a low price in the market, and a requirement that shareholders be
paid a low price is not of much use. The point is useful but ultimately
93. See Easterbrook, supra note 9; Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosureand Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
94. E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). The appraisal remedy also provides a safeguard
against freezeouts motivated by a desire to exploit inside information.
95. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(h) (1981). Model Business Corporation Act § 81 (a)(3) is
similar but less explicit about the value arising from the expectation of a gain-creating transaction. It
provides that " '[flair value' of shares means their value immediately before the effectuation of the
corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of such corporate action unless such exclusion would be inequitable." The Act does not define
"inequitable." Cf. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) (in an eminent domain case, condemnee's compensation does not include increase in property value that results from government's
project); Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co. v. United States, No. 81-2195 (7th Cir. Apr. 26, 1982) (Posner,
J.) (railroad not entitled to any increment of value attributable to special position or needs of the
acquiror).
96. The major defect in the appraisal remedy is the practical difficulty of asserting it. Because
there are often significant delays in securing an award, parties must bear their own costs, and benefits
obtained inure equally to all shareholders who dissent, there are strong incentives not to seek an
appraisal. These difficulties would be minimized if successful dissenters were paid costs including
attorneys' fees.
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misleading. First, the argument is based on the erroneous premise that
rules for corporate control transactions allow investors to be frozen out at
an artificially low price. Values in appraisal proceedings are typically determined by reference to a weighted percentage of asset, earnings and
market price values. This procedure greatly reduces the chance that shareholders will receive less than the pre-transaction value of their investment,
and there is no evidence that shareholders are undercompensated in appraisal proceedings. Moreover, even if the rules for corporate control
transactions allowed shareholders to be frozen out at an artifically low
price, the prospect of a cash-out at a low price would lead purchasers to
pay less in the market. Purchasers still would obtain the ordinary rate of
return on their investments. If they were then cashed out at more than the
current price of their shares-even if that price is "depressed"-they
would obtain more than an ordinary rate of return on their money.
Suppose, however, that a firm's shares trade at "depressed" prices not
because of the prospect of a cash-out but because the shareholder in control of the firm uses that control to prevent other investors from receiving
the benefits of the enterprise. Perhaps he siphons all profits to himself in
exorbitant salaries and perquisites, leaving nothing for other investors.
This siphoning may be open to attack on the usual grounds, just as theft
by managers is open to attack. If the diversion of profits is sufficiently
subtle that it escapes effective challenge in light of the business judgment
rule, however, the controlling shareholder may be able to depress the
value of others' investments perpetually. Does it then follow that pretransaction market value is the wrong standard to use in corporate control
transactions?9 7
We think not. If the controlling party has the ability to depress prices
forever, the helpless investors will be delighted to receive an extra penny
for their shares and would not assert a claim for more, if such a claim
would prevent the change of control. Moreover, the shareholders suffer
their loss when the wastrel becomes entrenched because the lower profit
expectation is immediately reflected in lower share prices. People who buy
shares after the existing control group is entrenched will receive an ordinary return on their investment. If a control change in the future is accompanied by a premium payment to these owners, they receive a windfall, and the other shareholders who sold in the interim receive nothing.'
We can think of no argument for such windfalls when part of the cost is
97. See Corporate FairShares, supra note 4, at 306 (argument that reliance on pre-transaction
market value is inappropriate in this situation).
98. Cf Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974) (person
who purchases shares after alleged waste of corporate assets has been completed may not recover for
loss; situation is the same even if corporation, under new control, brings suit in its own right).
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the suppression of at least some otherwise beneficial transactions.9
F. Corporate Opportunities
We conclude this section with a brief look at the rules governing corporate opportunities. An opportunity is a business venture of some sort, and
the allocation of an opportunity within a family of affiliated corporations,
or between a corporation and an officer, is a control transaction as we
have used that term.
Given the survey of the law to this point, it is not surprising that there
is no sharing principle in the law of corporate opportunities. A parent
corporation may allocate a business opportunity to itself, for example,
even though public shareholders in a subsidiary believe that this is unfair.1"' A corporation also may allocate an opportunity to one of its managers. The "corporate opportunity doctrine", far from forbidding such allocations, simply requires that the opportunity be presented to and passed
on by the firm's directors or other officers. The firm is free to decline to
pursue the opportunity, releasing it to a director or officer. Such releases
are common when an employee of the firm has an invention or an idea for
a new product that he holds in higher esteem than does the firm. The
classic corporate opportunity doctrine cases deal with undisclosed conversions of opportunities; they are to corporate control transactions as theft is
to salary.
A number of scholars have decried the state of the law, proposing that
current rules be replaced with doctrines of equitable sharing' or even
absolute bans on the allocation of opportunities to parent corporations or
corporate managers. Victor Brudney and Robert Clark contend, for example, that the prospect of overreaching by managers is so great that nothing
save prohibition could protect the interests of shareholders. 2
One response to these proposals is that they will deter the undertaking
of some value-increasing ventures, or cause them to be undertaken inefficiently. Moreover, in most cases there is no agency cost ("conflict of interest") problem requiring attention. When managers decide whether to
allocate an opportunity to a parent or a subsidiary, the allocation decision
will reflect the managers' best judgment about which firm can best develop the opportunity because the same people effectively control both
firms. The managers' interests in allocation coincide with shareholders'
99. See supra pp. 709-10 (example in which highly unequal division of gains was necessary to
induce holder of control to surrender position that gave him access to profits and perquisites).
100. See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Myerson v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967).
101. See Cary, supra note 4, at 679-83.
102. Brudney & Clark, supra note 4.
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interests-each wants the venture to be exploited by the corporate structure that can do so best, because that result will generate the greatest
profits, and thus the highest share prices for investors and the highest
salaries for managers.
Much of the existing literature assumes that a parent corporation will
allocate corporate opportunities to itself to avoid sharing of the gains with
minority shareholders of the subsidiary corporation. Brudney and Clark,
for example, argue that this danger is so great that corporate opportunities should presumptively be awarded to the subsidiary corporation. '
The argument is defective because it ignores the possibility of side payments. Assume that a corporate opportunity is worth $100 to a 70%
owned subsidiary but only $80 to the parent. It might appear that the
parent would allocate the opportunity to itself even though it could use the
opportunity less profitably, because the $80 gain is greater than the $70
(70% x $100) gained if the opportunity is allocated to the subsidiary. But
the parent corporation could gain more than $80 by allocating the opportunity to the subsidiary and charging it some amount between $11 and
$30. The charge could be explicit or implicit. That is, the parent's other
dealings with the subsidiary could somehow be adjusted to compensate it
for the release of the opportunity-transfer pricing between parents and
subsidiaries is extremely flexible."0 4 Thus the opportunity would be allocated to the firm that could use it more efficiently, and all parties, including the minority shareholders of the subsidiary, would benefit as a
result."0 5
The same is true when managers take opportunities for themselves. Assigning the opportunity to the manager may reduce agency costs by enabling the manager to receive a greater part of the marginal gains produced by his efforts. The manager would view the business opportunity as
just another form of compensation similar to (but more risky than) salary,
bonuses, and stock options. Managers properly take opportunities for
themselves when they can exploit them more profitably than the firm. The
increase in the value of the opportunity creates the possibility of a mutually beneficial transaction between manager and firm: the manager takes
the venture, and the firm reduces the manager's other compensation.
Such a transaction is the equivalent of a decision to hire the manager
only part-time, leaving him free to pursue other things during the rest of
his time. Indeed, part-time employment is common in labor markets.
103. Id.
104. Indirect evidence suggests that devices to transfer gains between affiliated firms exist and are
used frequently. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 54 J. BUS.
345, 346 (1980).
105. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
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Sometimes firms want to hire only one or two percent of a person's time,
and they obtain such labor inputs from independent contractors (e.g., law
firms and architects). Sometimes firms want 100% of the agent's time. But
figures in between are sensible too. Law schools typically hire approximately 50% of professors' time, giving them four months in the summer
and some time off during the year to do as they please (consulting, travel,
teaching elsewhere, even writing). Part-time employment arises when, at
the margin, a person's time is more valuable to some other employer or to
the agent himself (pursuing other projects or simply taking life at leisure)
than to the firm. The part-time employee compensates the firm through a
reduced salary.
This might appear misleading, because executives who take opportunities typically do not reduce their salaries on the spot or explicitly accept
part-time employment. But managers' time commitments are flexible; taking the opportunity may coincide with a reduction from 60 to 50 hours
spent on the firm's business each week. The salary reduction may be part
of an ex post settling up 106 with the firm as the employee receives a lower
bonus or a lower salary for the future. The adjustment also may come ex
ante because employees will accept a lower salary from a firm that allows
its officials to exploit business opportunities on the side. Either way, the
executive will pay for what he takes.
It will not do to say that executives have "bargaining power" that they
use to avoid this settling up. Although managers doubtless can exploit
their positions to a degree, they are constrained by labor markets, product
markets, and the market for corporate control. No matter how much bargaining power the managers have, they are better off if they do what
shareholders prefer and assign the opportunity to the corporation or person that can put it to best use. Such behavior creates a bigger pie, which
managers may slice in favor of both investors and themselves. And a ban
on the assignment of opportunities to managers would not reduce their
bargaining power or facilitate monitoring.
Perhaps it is generally beneficial for managers to abjure opportunities. 107 If so, then they can benefit by promising to allocate all new ventures to the firm. Although it should be relatively easy to reach such contracts, they appear to be rare, which suggests that shareholders' interests
coincide with the existing legal rules.
106. The term is from Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON.
288 (1980).
107. The taking of opportunities is similar in some respects to insider trading, and some of the
costs of such trading apply to opportunities too. See Easterbrook, supra note 9 at 332-35. There is
nonetheless little reason for a legal rule concerning the use of opportunities. The exploitation of such
opportunities by managers with firms' approval is, by assumption, known to the firm, while insiders'
trading is easier to keep secret.
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IV. The Meaning of Fiduciary Duty in Other Contexts
We have shown that a legal rule allowing unequal division of the gains
from corporate control transactions furthers the shareholders' interests,
provided that no shareholder be made worse off. We have also shown that
existing legal rules, for the most part, are consistent with our analysis. We
conclude in this section by briefly discussing and distinguishing several
situations where equal division of gains is the norm.
A familiar rule of partnership law is that, unless the partners otherwise
agree, profits must be shared equally and no partner is entitled to a salary.1"' The rationale for this rule is clear-because the number of partners is typically small, it is relatively easy for partners to reach contractual agreements relating to particular contributions. If unequal division is
necessary to provide an incentive to create gains, the partners can accomplish this by private agreement. Moreover, because partners generally invest much of their human capital in the partnership, they are unable to
diversify this part of their investment "portfolio." Partners who are risk
averse therefore benefit from a rule of equal division.
Another rule of law is that dividends must be distributed pro rata to
each shareholder of the same class in a corporation. 10 There is no tension
between this rule and the fiduciary principle in corporate control transactions. Unequal division of the gains resulting from corporate control
transactions increases shareholders' welfare by creating an incentive to
produce such gains and thereby to add to the value of the firm. The same
is not true with respect to dividends. The payment of a dividend is simply
a transfer of assets from a firm to its shareholders. No gains are created in
the process. Thus a legal rule allowing unequal distribution of dividends
might increase the frequency of dividend payments, but this would not
increase the value of the firm," 0 On the contrary, a rule allowing unequal
division of dividends would make shareholders worse off because they
would have an incentive to incur wasteful expenditures by monitoring the
withdrawal of assets from the firm. Thus the rule prohibiting unequal
payment of dividends, like the fiduciary principle allowing unequal division of gains resulting from corporate transactions, is perfectly consistent
with the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth.
We think that a more complete survey of agency, partnership, and corporate law would reveal that the likelihood of a sharing rule turns on two
108. U.P.A. §§ 18(a), (0 (1914).
109. The rule is not as fundamental as it appears, because it can be evaded by creating a separate
class of stock.
110. The classic statement of the argument that divided policy does not affect the value of the firm
is Miller & Modigliani, supra note 75. For a discussion of the implications of this argument for the
legal regulation of dividend policy, see Fischel, supra note 24.
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things: the probability that unequal divisions would produce gains, and
the number of participants in the venture. As either quantum rises, a
sharing rule becomes less useful in maximizing the wealth of investors.
Conclusion
We have argued that the fiduciary principle should incorporate a
wealth maximization standard, that an unequal division of gains from corporate control transactions facilitates wealth maximization, and that corporation law almost never requires gain sharing. In general, the law is
congruent with shareholders' interests in this regard; "fairness" plays little role in the fiduciary principle, and perhaps it should play none.
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